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ABSTRACT 
 
The UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopted in Montreal, 29 January, 2000 and opened for 
signature in Nairobi, 15-26 May, 2000 will exert a profound effect on international trade in 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and their products.  In this paper, the background to the 
drafting and negotiation of the Protocol is outlined, and potential effects of various articles of the 
Protocol on international trade in GMOs are analyzed.  Based on the present status of imports of 
GMOs and domestic research and development of biotechnology in China, likely trends in 
imports of foreign GMOs and related products after China accedes to WTO is explored.  Also, 
China’s strategies and countermeasures to control and regulate imports of GMOs in line with 
implementation of the Protocol are discussed. 
 
Keywords: biosafety, Cartagena Protocol, genetically modified organism, trade, China. 
  
Effects of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol on Trade in GMOs, 
WTO Implications, and Consequences for China 
 
Some 1500 diplomats and experts from 156 countries and the related international organizations 
met in Nairobi, 15-26 May, 2000 for the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (COP5). A highlight of the meeting was the signing of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international legal document to control the transboundary 
movement, transit, handling and use of all living modified organisms (LMOs) that may have 
adverse effects on human health and the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 
Sixty-four governments plus the European Community signed the protocol during the meeting, 
and the document will continue to be open for signature by nations and regional economic groups 
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 June, 2000 to 4 June, 2001.  As it is 
signed and subsequently enters into force, the protocol will produce profound impacts on 
international trade in biotechnology and its products. This paper will focus on analyzing the 
potential effects of the protocol’s implementation on global trade in genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and their products, especially the impacts of imports of GMOs in China. 
Accordingly, the paper will consider China’s strategies and countermeasures to implement the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and regulate its import trade in GMOs.  
 
1. Background and Foci of Cartagena Protocol Negotiations 
 
1.1 Biotechnology development and environmental safety 
 
Population growth, limited resources and deteriorating environments have become a fundamental 
concern for human survival and development. At the same time technical advance led by 
scientific research is regarded as an essential approach to overcome these concerns. Due to the 
development and wide spread application of techniques in genetic recombination and cell 
engineering since 1970s, biotechnology has entered a new modern stage, and is yielding huge 
economic benefits. Economic benefits are especially large because of the rapid growth of modern 
biotechnology industries based on genetic engineering. Industrialization of biotechnology has 
greatly promoted global trade in biotechnological products, especially in development and 
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application of agricultural biotechnology.  For example, transgenic crops, such as genetically 
modified (GM) crops with insect resistance and herbicide tolerance, account for a large area of 
commercial production and the products have been widely and regularly exported to other 
countries.  However, the environmental release of the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
may be potentially harmful to human health and biodiversity. Also the process of handling, 
packing, transportation, storage and application for GMOs may produce environmental risks. 
Particularly, some living GMOs used as food and consumed directly by human beings, could 
pose safety risks. Consequently, as the industrialization of biotechnology has increased, the 
safety issue of biotechnology has become a concern of international society and governments in 
most countries, and a major issue for environmental cooperation between countries. Many 
developing countries are afraid of those developments and have expressed caution and worry 
because they lack the necessary scientific or regulatory capacities in this field of biotechnology. 
Therefore, these countries placed their hopes for international legal, financial and technological 
support in an international biosafety agreement. Many developed countries, based on their 
situations in relation to trade in GMOs, also expressed the need for an international agreement. 
This led the development and final emergence of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
 
1.2 Relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 
 
The formulation of Cartagena Protocol is based on some Articles of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which was drafted and negotiated starting in 1988, and adopted in 1992 during 
the UNCED in Brazil. It entered into force on 29 December, 1993. So far, CBD has been ratified 
by 177 countries. During the inter-governmental negotiation of CBD, biosafety gradually became 
a core issue (Xue and Gao, 1995), and finally became an important part of the Convention. For 
example: 
Article 8(g) requests each Contracting Party to establish or maintain means to regulate, 
manage or control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified 
organisms resulting from biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental 
impacts on biodiversity and human health.   
• 
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Article 19(3) asks the Parties to consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting 
out appropriate procedures, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the 
safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from 
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on biodiversity. 
• 
• Also, Article 19(4) requires each Contracting Parties to provide any available information 
about the use and safety regulations required by that Contracting Party in handling such 
organisms, as well as any available information on the potential adverse impacts of the 
specific organisms.  
So, the Protocol is an international instrument under the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
 
1.3 Processes Resulting in the Drafting of the Protocol 
 
The Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD (COP2) held in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, November 1995 adopted Decision II/5 to develop a protocol on biosafety, specifically 
focusing on transboundary movement of any living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from 
modern biotechnology. Then an open-ended ad hoc Working Group on Biosafety (BSWG) was 
formed to act as the negotiating body and was given the task of producing a final draft treaty by 
1998. The Working Group met five times between 1996 and 1998, but failed to find sufficient 
common ground among the Parties. So BSWG reconvened for a sixth time in Cartagena, 
Colombia in 14-19 February 1999 to pave the way for the adoption of the Biosafety Protocol at 
an Extraordinary Conference of Parties to CBD (ExCOP) following on immediately from the 
Working Group meeting in Cartagena, 22-23 February, 2000. However, agreement was not 
reached. Later an informal meeting on the Biosafety Protocol was held in Vienna from 15 to 19 
September, 1999 to narrow down the remaining contentious areas. An agreement for the 
Protocol's text was finally reached at the Resumed Session on the First ExCOP in Montreal, 
Canada, 24-29 January, 2000.  
 
1.4 Background to Negotiation of the Protocol  
 
Because of large differences between the extent of development of biotechnology by countries, as 
well as the need to deal with sensitive issues such as trade in biotechnological products and the 
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influence of biotechnology on biodiversity conservation and human health, most countries gave 
considerable attention to the inter-governmental negotiations of the Protocol's text. Long and 
difficult negotiations were involved  with heated arguments. Considering their own interests, the 
participating countries had serious disagreements about the Protocol's text, and the negotiators 
had clearly divided themselves into five alliances in the end of Cartagena meeting in February 
1999 (Gupta 2000, Falkner 2000, Cosbey and Burgiel 2000).  
 
Seeing that their domestic capacity to deal with the safe use of biotechnology is weak, the 
majority of developing countries expressed caution and were worried about the transboundary 
movements of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)1. Developing countries insisted on 
precautionary principle and advocated the drafting of a strict international legislation to control 
and standardize transboundary movement of GMOs, in order to minimize the adverse affects of 
GMOs on biodiversity and human health. This coalition, called the Like-Minded Group, mostly 
consisted of G-77 countries and China.  
         
Another group, the Miami Group, on the other hand, was worried that a strict protocol would 
hinder their huge benefits from exporting GM-crop products. Their interest was to have free trade 
in such GM products without burdensome bureaucratic approval procedures, and without 
allowing room for protectionist trade barriers in the name of environmental protection. The 
Miami Group represents the major exporters of GM seeds and crops, consisting of the six 
countries, namely Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, US and Uruguay.  
         
Countries of the European Union (EU), as a group, strove for a strong Protocol and argued for 
strong language supporting the precautionary principle. EU advocated standardizing trade in 
LMOs and emphasized the protocol should not be subordinated to WTO agreements. As these 
countries, at present, are more importers than exporters and have developed systematic regional 
directives and national legislation covering all facets of trade, handling, and use of LMOs, they 
were, sometimes, inclined towards greater safeguards in the Protocol. 
 
                                                          
1 To direct attention away from genetic engineering as the focus of regulatory attention, "living modified organisms 
resulting from biotechnology" (LMOs) replaced "genetically modified organisms" (GMOs) finally during the 
process of CBD and the Protocol development. 
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Another group, the Compromise Group mostly consisted of OECD countries which are not 
agricultural exporters and not part of the EU. They included Japan, Mexico, Norway, South 
Korea and Switzerland, and were later joint by Singapore and New Zealand. The Compromise 
Group tried to bridge the major gaps between the other negotiating groups by developing 
compromise positions and alternative formulations.  
        
The remaining group consists of the Central and Eastern European countries. This Group 
generally took a middle-of-the-road position. While favoring the inclusion of GMO food or feed 
products and the precautionary principle in the Protocol, this Group focused primarily on the 
practicality and applicability of various proposals.  
         
So, the final agreement about the text of the Protocol involved bargaining by the various interest 
groups, rather than initial consensus.  
 
1.5 Negotiating positions of Parties to the Protocol 
 
(1) General positions 
 
Before the Cartagena meeting in February 1999, delegations involved in the Protocol's inter-
governmental negotiation can be roughly divided into two coalitions on a consisting of 
developing countries and the other of developed countries, and their positions are generally 
described as follows: 
 
Procedures for transboundary movements of LMOs 
Since transboundary movement of LMOs mainly occurs from developed countries to developing 
countries, most developing countries considered that the Party of export should inform the 
competent national authority of the Party of import in advance of exporting, and intended 
transboundary movement should occur only after the Party of import has given its consent. 
However, some developed countries such as USA, Japan, Canada and Australia proposed that 
any company, university, research institute or representative agency should be able to apply for 
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transboundary movement, and the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure should not 
hinder international trades. 
 
Risk assessment and risk management 
Risk assessment and risk management are often effective means to minimize the potential 
environmental disasters resulting from LMOs. Most developing countries insisted that 
standardized risk assessment and practical risk management be the foundation for the Party of 
import to decide if it would agree to the import of an LMO.  These countries argued that it was 
necessary to list the requirements and standards of risk assessment as an appendix to the Protocol.  
However, the US and Japan suggested that it was not necessary for the Protocol to involve risk 
assessment and risk management, nor to principally mention it, if they are involved in. 
 
Non-discrimination principle for import and export of LMOs 
Trade discrimination involves a barrier to international trade. It is against the rules of WTO. 
Some developed countries advocated that LMO imports and exports should be subject to the 
principle of same treatment for each country and same treatment for foreign and domestic 
products, and unfair discrimination should not be allowed. On the contrary, most developing 
countries considered that because LMOs and their products have particular implications for 
environmental protection and for human health, each country should have the right to decide 
whether to import a foreign LMO or not. 
 
Socio-economic problems 
The transboundary movement of LMOs may give rise to some serious socio-economic problems 
in importing countries, including damage to traditional agriculture, loss of genetic resources, 
destruction to ecosystems and adverse impacts on ethics and cultures. Many developing countries 
insisted on taking into account the socio-economic situation arising from import of LMOs. 
However, some developed countries believed that the socio-economic problems were so 
complex, they should not be mentioned in the Protocol. 
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LMOs Information exchange 
Data and information is a necessary basis for the Party of import to make an advance-informed 
agreement (AIA) and to conduct relevant risk assessment prior to making the agreement.  Most 
developing countries considered that each Contracting Party was under an obligation to provide 
the Party of import with enough data and information concerning the import of LMOs for the 
importing countries to make an assessment, and any Contracting Party should not impede the 
information exchange by using the excuse of confidential data and information. But some 
developed countries considered that information exchange was one part of technology transfer, 
and that the Protocol should include sections for the protection of confidential information and 
intellectual property right. 
 
Liability for damage from LMOs and redress 
Some developing countries proposed that specification of liability and redress was necessary to 
implement the international protocol on biosafety. Exporters of LMOs should, in their view, be 
liable to pay for the damages to the environment and human health resulting from the exported 
LMOs in the importing countries. On the other hand, some developed countries were opposed to 
listing liability and redress as the Protocol's text. They suggested that it would be too complicated 
for a protocol. 
 
The extent of coverage of LMOs in the global trade 
A major argument during the negotiations was whether the Protocol should apply only to trade in 
living GMOs (e.g. seeds) or also to products made with the help of genetic engineering (e.g. 
medicines) or containing GM ingredients (e.g. food, animal feed). The GM-exporting countries, 
fearful of the potential repercussions for the burgeoning trade in GM foods and pharmaceutical 
products, insisted on a narrow definition of the Protocol's scope. GM-exporting countries would 
accept only a narrowly defined Protocol that was subject to the WTO's legal code. But most 
developing countries, as well as EU, wanted to have all biotechnological products covered by the 
treaty and they argued in favor of a document with more extensive scope and clearly defined 
exemptions from existing WTO obligations. In the end, the position of US and Miami Group 
delegations prevailed and the scope of the Protocol is limited to only LMOs (no inclusion of 
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derived products) as stated in Article 4 and pharmaceutical products are excluded as described in 
Article 5.  
 
(2) Polarization of positions 
 
Positions polarized around two contentious issues within protocol negotiations leading up to 
Cartagena (Gupta 2000). The first was disagreement over the categories of LMOs to be covered 
under the protocol and its AIA procedure. The second was disagreement about the decision-
making procedure that should govern LMO transfer. 
        
Disputes about the first set of concerns were largely along North-South lines. Developing 
countries argued for a broad spectrum of LMOs to fall within the scope of the Protocol and its 
AIA procedure. But most OECD countries argued for only those LMOs to be included that would 
come into contact with the environment of the importing country and thereby pose a threat to 
biodiversity.  
       
Disputes about the second set of concerns were largely an intra-OECD battle between the Miami 
Group and the European Union. This dispute turned on whether countries had the right to restrict 
LMO imports in the absence of scientific certainty of harm. This was closely linked to the highly 
contentious issue of the relationship of the Protocol to WTO obligations. 
 
2. The Content and Potential Effects of Cartagena Protocol on Global Trade in GMOs 
 
As described in the Article 4, the Cartagena Protocol shall apply to the transboundary movement, 
transit, handling and use of all LMOs that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity, taking also into account risks to human health.  According to the 
Article 3 of the Protocol, the definition of "Living Modified Organisms (LMOs)" refers to any 
living organisms that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use 
of modern biotechnology. While "modern biotechnology" means the application of in vitro 
nucleic acid techniques including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and techniques of 
fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family.  So, LMOs can be narrowly referred to as 
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Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) or transgenic organisms. Actually, current LMOs 
transboundary movement is mainly limited in the international trade of products to genetically 
modified (GM) plants and animals, including GM-crop seeds and other processed GM foods, as 
well as fish.  
       
The main potential effects of the articles of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety concerning 
international trade of GMOs are probably as follows:  
 
2.1 Advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure 
 
Article 7 of the Protocol provides that the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure shall 
apply prior to the first intentional transboundary movement of LMOs for international 
introduction into the environment of the Party of import.  The Article 8 states that the Party of 
export shall notify, or require the exporter to ensure notification in writing to, the competent 
national authority of the Party of import prior to the intentional transboundary movement of 
LMOs. 
To satisfy the provision of the Cartagena Protocol, import of GMOs should be subject to AIA 
procedure.  This will make the process of approval formality more complicated than before.  
Currently, in order to import and export GMOs and derived products it is only necessary to sign a 
contract simply with a commercial institution or trading company in countries of import, or only 
to have the approval by a public body responsible for the administration of agriculture. However, 
once the Protocol enters into force, trade in a GMO requires approval by a specified competent 
national authority in importing country. Generally, the competent national authority is a national 
administrative agency of environment in central government, or a coordinating unit formed by 
ministries of environment, agriculture and public health.  The international movement of GMOs 
will be reviewed more strictly than previously, not only from the view of agricultural production, 
but mainly from the viewpoint of environmental protection, human health and other aspects. 
Increased cost will be involved in the export and import of GMOs.  
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2.2 Decision procedure for GMOs introduction 
 
Article 9 of the Protocol stipulates that the Party of import will acknowledge receipt of the 
notification and state whether the country will process the exporting application according to the 
domestic regulatory framework. The Article 10 states that the Party of import shall notify in 
writing to the Party of export that they approve of the import with or without conditions, or 
prohibit the import and or request additional relevant information in accordance with its domestic 
regulatory framework. Also the Article 10(5) specifies that failure by the Party of import to 
communicate its decision shall not imply its consent to an international transboundary movement. 
       
The decision procedure provides the Party of import with an opportunity to design green barriers 
and allows some flexibility for decision-making.  As the decision-making procedure is subject to 
domestic regulatory framework, the Party of import can formulate some concrete strict domestic 
regulations under the framework of the Protocol to limit the import and export of GMOs in order 
to protect the country's benefits.  Also the Party of import can willfully revise their domestic 
regulations according to their actual requirements, to make the domestic regulations more 
subjective, protectionist and political, though Article 9(3) emphasizes that the domestic 
regulatory framework shall be consistent with the Protocol's objectives. 
 
2.3 Information requirements 
 
Article 8 of the Protocol provides that the Party of export shall enclose, at a minimum, the 
information specified in Annex 1 in its notification and shall ensure that there is a legal 
requirement to help enforce the accuracy of information provided by the exporter. In light of this 
Article, information provision is obligatory for exporters, and the information listed in Annex 1 is 
required to be a detailed description. It must include: name and identity of LMOs of the biosafety 
level in the State of export; centers of origin and centers of genetic diversity of the recipient 
organism and/or the parental organisms; taxonomic status and characteristics of the donor 
organisms related to biosafety; description of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced, the 
technique used, and the resulting characteristics of the LMOs; intended use of the LMOs or 
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products; quantity or volume of the LMO to be transferred; a previous and existing risk 
assessment report; regulatory status of the LMO within the State of export; and so on. 
 
2.4 Procedure for LMOs intended for direct use as human food or livestock feed, or for 
processing 
 
The Protocol in Article 11(4) provides that a Party may take a decision on the import of LMOs 
intended for direct use as food or animal feed, or for processing, under its domestic regulatory 
framework that is consistent with the objective of this Protocol. Further, Article 11(8) stipulates 
that lack of insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the 
potential adverse effects of a LMO on biodiversity shall not prevent the Party of import from 
taking a decision, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. 
       
The Protocol deals with the international movement of LMOs for food and livestock feed in a 
special article, because import and export of food and feed is very significant in global trade. 
Indeed, international trade of GMOs' food and animal feed has become more and more important 
in recent years, and this trade is accelerating. That GMO food and animal feed are subject to both 
the AIA procedure and domestic regulatory framework implies that the Party of import has 
opportunities to erect green barrier to protect the country from the large imports of GMO food or 
animal feed, or GMOs for processing.  It will probably give rise to disputes between countries for 
trading in GMO food and animal  feed. 
 
2.5 Risk assessment  
 
Article 15(2) demands that the Party of import shall ensure that risk assessments are carried out 
or may require the exporter to carry out the risk assessment. Article 15(3) adds that the cost of 
risk assessment shall be borne by the exporter if the Party of import so requires.  In particular, the 
Annex 2 of the Protocol prescribes a series of principles, methodology and points to consider for 
risk assessment of LMOs.  The risk assessment steps mainly include: identification of any novel 
genotypic and phenotypic characteristics associated with the LMO that may have adverse effects 
on biodiversity and human health; an evaluation of the likelihood and consequences of these 
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adverse effects; an estimation of the overall risk posed by the LMO based on the evaluation of 
the likelihood and consequences; and a recommendation as to whether or not the risks are 
acceptable or manageable. 
       
The Protocol provides the Party of import with the right to carry out risk assessment for the 
proposed import of GMOs. That implies that the Party of import has a right to impose strict 
conditions for the risk assessment if the country wants to hinder the import of the GMOs. The 
proposed export may fail the risk assessment test or the exporter could suffer a long period of 
assessment.  Meanwhile, Article 15 does not impose any economic liability for risk assessment 
on the importer because the Party of import can request exporter to pay the expenses of the risk 
assessment, and can also directly ask the exporter to conduct the risk assessment if the country 
has no capacity to do risk assessments. 
 
2.6 Handling, transport, package and identification 
 
Article 18(2) of the Protocol provides that each Party shall provide at least minimum 
documentation,  
(a) to clearly identify the LMOs that are intended for direct use as food or feed, or for 
processing as LMOs and as not for intentional introduction into environment; and specifies 
their identity and any unique identification;   
(b) to clearly identify LMOs that are destined for contained use as LMOs; and specifies any 
requirements for the safe handling, storage, transport and use of those; and 
(c) to clearly identify any other LMOs that are intended to be introduced into the environment 
of the Party of import as LMOs; and specifies the identity and relevant traits and/or 
characteristics, and any requirements for the safe handling, storage, transport and use. 
 
Documentation such as labeling is required by this article to identify LMOs for the three 
situations of direct use (food or animal feed, or for processing), contained use and intended 
environmental release.  Though the LMOs are for different uses, labeling requirements are 
similar and must identify relevant traits of the GMOs and requirements in handling, storage, 
transfer and use. Those labeling measures are likely to have an adverse effect on the market for 
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GMOs and products.  Because labeling may increase consumers' concerns, it will probably result 
in a price penalty for GMOs and GMO-based products. 
 
2.7 Liability and redress 
 
Article 27 of the Protocol states that the Conference of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at their 
first meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of international rules 
and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from transboundary 
movements of LMOs, and shall endeavor to complete this process within four years. 
       
The issue of liability and redress is one of the main issues during the Protocol's inter-
governmental negotiation. Negotiators failed to reach agreement on this issue and had to leave it 
to the first meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Protocol.  It is likely that irrespective of 
whether an agreement or not is reached in the first meeting, the Parties of import will insist on 
liability and redress.  Once the principle of liability and redress is adopted, it will be an another 
limitation on international movement of GMOs. 
 
3. Trends in the Development of Global Trade in GMOs and Its Effects in China  
 
3.1 Commercial production of GMOs and economic benefits 
 
Scientists first obtained transgenic plants by genetic engineering in 1983, but gene transformation 
technology only become commercially relevant after 10 years.  Following the first pilot 
experiment conducted in the United States and in France in 1986, more than 25,000 pilot 
experiments had been conducted globally by the end of 1997.  Following the approval in the 
United States by the commercial production of transgenic late-ripening tomatoes in 1994, a total 
51 species of transgenic plants had been approved worldwide for industrialized production before 
the end of 1997. These included transgenic crops (GM crops) of cotton, corn, soybean, oilseed 
rape and potato that are resistant to insects, diseases and herbicides. These account for a large 
area of plantings (Liu, 1999). 
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The global area of GM crop production is estimated to be 1.7 million ha in 1996, but the area 
increased dramatically to 12.5 million ha in 1997, of which the planted area for GM soybean, 
corn and oilseed rape had increased 10 times compared with 1996.  Furthermore, there were 
further large increases to 27.8 million ha in 1998 and 39.9 million ha in 1999 (Falkner 2000). GM 
crops accounted for 54% of the area sown with soybean, 28% for corn, 9% for cotton and 9% for 
rape seed in 1999.  By gene types, 71% of GM crops were for herbicide tolerance, 22% for insect 
resistance and 7% for both herbicide tolerance and insect resistance2.  
        
The plantings of GM crops is concentrated in a few countries.  For example, of 27.8 million 
hectares planted to GM crops in 1998, US accounted for 74%, Argentina for 15%, Canada for 
10%, and Australian for 1%. Mexico, France, China, and South Africa constituted the remainder, 
each with less than 1% (Gupta 2000).  
        
GM crops have produced huge economic benefits. In the United States for example, in 1997, 
more than 1 million ha of insect-resistant GM cotton was planted, which increased average yield 
by 7%, and net profit by 83 US Dollars per ha. In total, direct benefit from GM cotton for 1997 
was estimated to be 100 million USD.  In 1998, 5 million ha was planted to insect-resistant GM 
corn and it increased average yield by 9%, and net profit per ha by 68 USD. It is estimated to 
have given a total benefit of 340 million USD for the total GM corn crop.  Moreover, in 1997, 1.2 
million ha was planted to herbicide tolerant (oilseed) rape, resulting in an increase of 9% in yield 
and a 50 USD per ha increase in profit. The overall farm benefits for 1997 were estimated to be 
60 million USD for the total GM rape crop (Liu 1999). It is believed that in 1999 35% of the US 
corn acreage and 55% of soybean acreage was genetically modified. It is estimated that 
approximately 60% of the processed foods in a US consumer's shopping cart may contain 
genetically engineered constituents3.  
  
The global sales volume of GM crops increased approximately 30-fold in the period 1995-99. 
Global sales were estimated to be USD 75 million in 1995, USD 235 million in 1996, USD 670 
million in 1997, and between USD 1.2 and USD 1.5 billion in 1998 (James, 1998). And the 
                                                          
2 Data from Agricultural Biotechnology Information (in Chinese), 1999(3):1 
3 Bereano P. The politics of genetically engineered foods: the United States versus Europe, Seattle Times newspaper, 
8 Nov. 1999 
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global market for GM crops is projected to reach USD 8 billion in 2005, and USD 25 billion in 
2010 (Falkner 2000).  
       
The growing large area planted to GM crops will certainly result in major exports of GMOs and 
their products. Some GM crops such as cotton, corn, soybean, oilseed rape (canola) and tomato 
have already become important internationally traded commodities, both for their seeds and in 
processed products. However, the transboundary movement and environmental release of large 
quantity of GMOs and their products could have adverse effects on biodiversity and human 
health in the countries of import. At least this is a current fear. 
      
3.2 The present status of foreign GMOs and GMO-based products exported to China 
 
China’s import of food has increased in recent decades. It imported about 5 million tons of food 
each year in the 1960s and 1970s. But in the 1990s this quadrupled. Since 1995 China’s import of 
food, cotton, edible oil and sugar, were respectively reached of 20, 0.7, 3.0 and 2.5 million tons 
(Liu 1999).  China’s food imports have remained of about 20 million tons in recent years.  Its 
imported food items and edible oil are mainly imported from the United States and Canada, 
which are the main countries with GMOs crops. These two countries export over 28 million 
tonnes of oilseeds and 100 million tonnes of cereals each year (Hodgson 2000). In light of China 
State statistics on import of commodities in 1998 (China Customs, 1999), the quantity of 
imported food, animal feed and oil only from USA and Canada was more than 40% of China’s 
total imports of food, feed and oil in that year. Of its imports, 75% of corn, 55% of soybean and 
65% of animal feed were imported from USA; 67% rape seed was from Canada, and 86% of 
wheat was from both USA and Canada (Table 1). 
 
GM products accounted for a large proportion of China’s imported foods, animal feeds and oils. 
It was reported that, in the United State in 1999, 57% of the land for soybean production was 
planted with the GM herbicide-tolerant varieties, 55% of the whole cotton land with GM insect-
resistant cotton, and 43% of the whole corn plantation with GM corn4 (Tribe 2000). For 
Canadian oil rape, GM varieties also occupied over 50% of the whole planted area in 1999.  
                                                          
4 http://www.sina.com.cn 2000/04/04, news from Science and Technology Daily (China) 
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Although wheat and barley are not large commercial GM crops yet, GM wheat and GM barley 
are potentially large exports from the USA and Canada to China.  Therefore, GMOs food imports 
probably pose a significant potential risk to environment and human health in China. 
 
Table 1. The statistics of imports of food and food products by China from USA and 
Canada in 1998 
Importing from USA Importing from Canada Total importing in China Names of imported foods 
and other products Quantity 
(ton) 
Value 
(103 USD) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Value 
(103 USD) 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Value 
(103 USD) 
 1. Corn       
Corn seeds 188907 23967   250623 31770 
Crude corn granule & powder 468 191   490 206 
Fine corn powder 135 55   218 97 
Other processed corn 316 295   482 459 
Corn chaff, bran and residue 11050 4709   11077 4728 
Corn starch     1856 1289 
Preliminarily extracted corn oil     940 650 
Other corn oil & separate goods     596 478 
2. Soybean       
Yellow soybean seeds 1265360 313131 10819 3734 2339845 581148 
Black soybean seeds   871 282 871 282 
Greenish black soybean seeds 30000 8725   30085 8741 
Other soybean 454652 124312 843 319 816971 212527 
Soybean powder 2410 632 120 31 8847 2659 
Preliminarily extracted oil 373080 231009 41 21 753968 470617 
Other oil & separate goods 24709 16324 1765 885 77720 52240 
Soybean chaff, bran and residue 21615 4624 116 12 340364 67698 
Soybean cake(after oil extracted) 255747 69604   825038 199128 
Residue (after oil extracted) 591840 146969   2897264 622749 
3. Oil rape       
Rape seeds   928990 268160 1386413 402457 
Preliminarily extracted rape oil 9721 5374 36971 23734 246290 153020 
Other rape oil & separate goods 3234 2096 5821 3765 38415 21933 
Residue (after rape oil extracted)   92 19 107246 12737 
4. Cotton       
Cotton seeds 39 17   39 17 
Cotton seed oil & separate goods 33 45   76 92 
Residue (after oil extracted)     121090 16835 
5. Potato       
Crude & fine potato powder 142 73   830 531 
Potato powder slice & granule 264 284   1681 1459 
Potato starch 667 598   24388 9507 
6. Feed       
Processed feed additive  16753 11912 1806 1202 49171 39086 
Unnamed compound animal feed 103164 12234 264 64 133926 21912 
7. Other main foods       
Wheat and mixed wheat 319003 57877 961661 179826 1489403 278570 
Barley    446786 79808 1519141 240966 
Total 3673309 1035057 2396966 561862 13475364 3456588 
Data source: China Customs Statistics Annual Report for 1998
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 3.3 China’s domestic development of GMOs and commercial production 
 
Besides significant introduction of GMOs and products from foreign countries to China, China 
has developed its domestic biotechnology rapidly during the past 10 years.  It is reported that 15 
crop species have been developed by Chinese domestic scientists in pilot experiments and have 
been modified for transgenic insect-resistance, virus-resistance and quality improvement. Of 
these, 6 varieties of GM insect-resistant cotton and virus-resistant tomatoes have been approved 
for commercial production. China’s statistics state that China had the fourth largest increase in 
the world planted to GM crops by the early 1990s, immediately after USA, Argentina and 
Canada. In the early 1990s China began to plant GM virus-resistant tobacco. A large area 
amounting to 1 million ha in 1996 and 1.6 million ha in 1997 was planted.  This tobacco planting 
was then famed as the largest GM plant community. Domestic research in GM insect-resistant 
cotton has also progressed, and two cases have been approved for pilot experiments of which one 
case was approved for commercial production with 10000 ha planted in 1998.  In addition, 
insect-resistant rice, disease-resistant potato and insect-resistant corn are undergoing pilot 
experiments (Liu 1999).  
          
It is reported that 47 plant species have been used in genetic engineering research in China. These 
include 7 grain crops, 5 economic non-food crops, 4 oil crops and 31 vegetable and fruit crops 
(Wang 1999) (Table 2).  
 
Table 2  Plant species used in genetic transformation in China 
Groups Number 
of species 
Crop species 
Grain crops 7 Rice, wheat, corn, potato, sorghum, millets, sweet 
potato  
Economic 
and 
 Oil crops 
9 Cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, sugar beet, soybean, 
oilseed rape, peanut, etc.  
Fruit and 
Vegetables 
21 Tomato, cabbage, carrot, pepper, sweet pepper, 
Chinese cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli, etc. 
Others 10 Poplar, alfalfa, etc. 
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 Normally the Ministry of Agriculture in China deals with applications for safety assessment of 
agricultural GMOs twice a year.  By 1998, applications had been lodged for 23 agricultural 
species, including 13 crops including cotton, rice, tobacco, potato, tomato, capsicum, etc.; 7 
plant-related micro-organisms such as corn azotobacter, soybean rhizobium and caryogram 
polyhedral virus; one veterinary micro-organism and two aquatic animals (common carp and 
golden carp) (Li and Liu 1999). 
        
By the end of 1998, a total of 86 applications have been accepted by the Ministry, including 63 
for plants, 19 for plant-related micro-organisms, 2 veterinary micro-organisms and 2 aquatic 
animals and plants. Among these 86 applications, 72 have passed the review of the Safety 
Assessment Committee, including 30 for pilot tests, 36 for environmental release and 6 for 
commercial production (Li and Liu 1999). 
 
4. The Trends in GMOs in International Trade with and by China 
 
4.1 Foreign biotechnology introduction is accelerating 
 
Some large biotechnology companies have paid considerable attention to China's extensive 
market. For example, Monsanto, Dupont and Pioneer of USA, Zeneca of UK and KWS of 
Germany have invested in research into GMOs and have conducted experiments in China 
through single-ventures or joint ventures. Some foreign biotechnology companies have already 
begun to undertake GMO pilot tests, environmental release and commercial production in China. 
For example, among the 68 GMO applications received by Ministry of Agriculture in 1998, 7 
were from Monsanto and 1 from Pioneer5.  The planting of the GM insect-resistant cotton 
obtained from Monsanto totalled 110,000 ha in China in 1998, and the area planted showed a 
large increase in 1999.  Pioneer has carried out pilot experiments for GM corn. There were 40 
pilot experiments underway in 1999 accounting for 6000m2 of land distributed in the 5 provinces 
of Shandong, Henan, Lioning, Jilin and Helongjiang. Besides, it has been found that among the 
                                                          
5 1998 annual report of the review results for GMOs safety assessment applications in China, issued by the Office of 
Genetic Engineering Safety Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Biotechnology Information, 1999 (1): 46-50. 
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foreign invested enterprises established during 1990-1996 there are more than 100 enterprises 
involved in GMOs and their products, with a total investment of USD 630 million.  
        
In addition, an Australian biotechnology and horticultural company, Technico, will invest AUD 
5.2 million to establish a production facility for its advanced seed potato technology in China and 
the facility will produce seeds to enable a production of 44 million tonnes of potatoes annually 
(ABA 2000). Furthermore, Australia's biotech-industry is preparing to collaborate with Taiwan 
by co-investment in Chinese herbal medicines (Hillyard 1999). 
However, when China accedes to WTO in near future, entry conditions to the Chinese market 
and competition mechanisms will be linked to the global society, and the market mechanism will 
be also subject to the rules of the WTO. Consequently, the Chinese technological market will be 
more open and competition will be more intense. This will lead to a substantial introduction of 
foreign high technology and products, especially biotechnology and its products. It is anticipated 
that after China accedes to WTO, foreign GMO products and GMO technologies will irresistibly 
enter Chinese markets at an accelerating rate in the next a few years. 
 
4.2 Import of agricultural GMOs and their products increasing 
 
China has a population of almost 1.3 billion. Though great successes have achieved in 
agricultural production, China still needs to import a huge amount of food to feed so many 
people; it is currently importing an amount of 20 million tons of food each year. Due to 
industrialization and urbanization as well as the policy of conserving forests, grasslands and lakes 
implemented in the proposed large development planned for middle and western China, China’s 
area of farmland will be continuously reduced. Meanwhile, its population will continue to 
increase and natural disasters such as flood and drought often happen in China. Therefore, 
China’s food imports will continue to increase for the foreseeable future.  China is considered to 
be the largest potential export market for food. This is one of the reasons why the American 
government actively supports China’s entry to the WTO. It is estimated that after China joins 
WTO, its main imports of food and oil varieties will increase by two to three times current levels, 
and cotton will increase fourfold (Liu 1999). China’s sources of imported food, cotton, edible oil 
and sugar are mainly the USA, Canada and Australia, and these countries are also major 
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countries involved in GMO food production. So, China will unavoidably become a vast GMO 
food market for these GMO exporting countries. 
 
4.3 Export potential of China’s domestic GMOs 
 
Actually, there exists competition between domestic developed GMOs and foreign introduced 
GMOs in applications for approval for environment releases and commercial productions. It is 
due to this competition and trade protectionism that the speed of the foreign GMO introduction 
has been limited objectively by China. However, experts estimate that China’s own development 
of GMOs may be used to meet domestic demands, rather than being exported. Currently, the GM 
product in China with largest export potential is tobacco leaf, but because of China’s GM tobacco 
production all European countries and US resolutely refuse to import tobacco from China. 
Because of GMO doubts, these countries even canceled contracts of USD 400-700 million for 
tobacco leaf and have imposed a great economic loss on China. Therefore, for the present and the 
foreseeable future, China’s domestic GMO exports will be very limited in quantity, but its 
imports of GMO products will be very large. 
       
Moreover, using imported GMO food for livestock will produce a potential effect on China's 
export of livestock products. Japan, the South Korea and European countries will execute 
labeling system for GMOs food. This means that exporters of livestock products to these 
countries must provide with certification indicating non-use of GMOs feeds, otherwise, exports 
of the livestock products will be refused or prices lowered. In addition, industrial products using 
GMOs as raw materials, such as cotton, may be faced with the same type of problem also in the 
future. 
 
5. China’s Countermeasures Implement the Cartagena Protocol and Regulate its Import of 
GMOs 
 
By signing and acceding to Cartagena Protocol, China will be able to more effectively control its 
imports of the GMOs that may have adverse effects on its environment and human health. China 
may use the Protocol's stipulations, such as AIA procedure, decision procedure, risk assessment, 
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identification, and liability and redress provisions, to control introduction of foreign GMOs, and 
to regulate the environmental release of introduced GMOs, their commercial production and use. 
If necessary, China could design some green barriers using the framework of international 
agreements, to prevent introduction of the GMOs that may have significant adverse effects on its 
environment and human health. But it may also face significant bargaining pressures in that 
regard from GMO-exporting nations. 
       
As the Protocol enters into effect and is implemented, China also can, according to the articles 
concerned, take administrative actions to enhance its management of the introduction of GMOs 
and to monitor introduced GMOs, as well as to regulate domestic research into GMOs and their 
commercial production. China’s possible countermeasures are outlined below. Some are already 
proposed in China’s National Biodiversity Framework, a government document in press (Xue et 
al., 1999). 
 
5.1 Institutional enhancement 
 
The current institutions and duties 
Presently, the main sectors involved in GMO safety and trade in Chinese government are as set 
out below. 
 
(1) The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
SEPA is the leading ministry for implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity in China, 
and also is the leading authority of the Chinese Government Delegation for participating in the 
inter-governmental negotiations for Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In 1998, the State Council, 
in its duty allocation document, provided SEPA with the new duty of environmental safety 
administration for biotechnology. The Cartagena Protocol, in its Article 19, requires each 
Contracting Party to designate one national focal point and one or more competent national 
authorities to be responsible for performing the administrative functions of the Protocol; and a 
Party may designate a single entity to fulfill the functions of both being a focal point and 
competent national authority.  Certainly, the authority will be responsible on behalf the country to 
conduct AIA procedures and apply decision procedures for GMO transboundary movement. 
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According to the current situation, SEPA will act as a sole competent national authority or the 
leading authority, if there is more than one authority involved in China. Doubtless, SEPA will 
also act as a watchdog and monitoring authority for biosafety and GMO issues. 
 
(2) Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
MOA is the most important sector for management of GMO pilot experiments and commercial 
production. At present, the GMO transboundary, environmental releases and commercial 
production, as well as GM food for international trade, are focused on GM agricultural crops. 
MOA has done much work on GMO safety management. In 1996, MOA issued "The Safety 
Administration Implementation Regulation on Agricultural Genetic Engineering" and established 
the corresponding organizations of Safety Administration Office and Safety Assessment 
Commission. The Regulation has been implemented, and the organizations have already operated 
normally to cope with applications of GMO pilot experiments, environmental releases and 
commercial production. MOA is definitely a very important institution for biosafety. 
 
(3) Ministry of Public Health(MOH) and State Medicine Monitoring Administration(SMMA) 
MOH is responsible for food safety and issued "Regulation of New Resource Food" in 1990. 
GMOs food can be defined as one kind of new resource food. MOH is in charge of approval for 
production of new resource foods and monitoring food hygiene. SMMA is responsible to 
monitoring medicine production and marketing. SMMA issued "Examining and Approving Rules 
for New Biological Medicines" and "Regulation of Importing Medicines" in 1999. It is in charge 
of approval of domestic medicine production and medicine imports and exports. As GMO food 
and GMO medicine may directly produce adverse effects on human health, the two institutions 
will play a very important function on biosafety. But, as the transboundary movement of GMO 
medicines is not included in the Protocol, the GMO medicine trade is not at present under the 
framework of Cartagena Protocol on biosafety. 
 
(4) Ministry of Foreign Trade & Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), Customs General and the 
State Inspection and Quarantine Agency (AIQA) 
MOFTEC is responsible to international trade including approval of GMO commodity imports 
and exports. The Customs General is in charge of customs formalities and customs tariffs for 
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imported and exported commodities including GMO products. AIQA is involved in quality 
inspection and quarantine of diseases, insects and weeds of imports and exports. These 
institutions have direct relationship to GMO trade. 
 
The practices of Western countries 
In 1986, U.S. issued a "Co-ordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology", and this 
framework stipulated that the three departments of the US government will be responsible for the 
management of biotechnology and products, i.e. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In terms 
of this framework, USDA, EPA and FDA all manage GMOs but they deal with different aspects 
of GMOs, depending on the categories of proposed use of GMOs and their products. Each sector 
has its own managerial scope and focus. 
 
Under the EU’s united codes and principles, each member country can regulate GMOs according 
to its own frameworks. For example, in UK, the responsible authority for biosafety is the 
Department of Environment, Traffic and Region (DETR), DETR is in charge of approval of 
GMO research, environmental release and commercial production. DETR may, sometimes, 
consult with other sectors involved in agriculture, fishery and food when they deal with the 
concrete GMO applications.  
       
In Germany, the national authority for biosafety is a combination of the three departments of 
Environment, Public Health and Agriculture. But arrangements differ from those in the US, 
because their management is not separate, and if one body disagrees to an application, it will be 
denied.  
       
In the Netherlands, as in the UK, the national authority is the Ministry of Environment. The 
Ministry is in charge of all GMO issues in the country, including issuing licenses for any GMO 
activities. 
       
In Australia, Gm food is regulated by the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA). 
Likewise, therapeutic goods are controlled by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA). 
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Agricultural and veterinary chemicals are overseen by the National Registration Authority 
(NRA). Imports and exports are governed by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service. 
These regulatory controls are underpinned by the Interim office of the Gene Technology 
Regulator (IOGTR), working with its Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee (GMAC). 
These two groups advise on the research, production and use of GMOs in Australia. A new 
permanent institution, the Gene Technology Regulator (GTR) will be operational by January 
2001, instead of IOGTR. GTR is created by the new legislation of Gene Technology Bill 20006.  
 
In addition, there are two organizations that are responsible to biotechnology management in 
Australia. One is Biotechnology Australia (BA), a multi-portfolio agency with the members from 
different departments. BA's principle tasks are to develop a comprehensive national strategy for 
biotechnology. Another one is Biotechnology Consultative Group (BIOCOG), comprised of 
leading individuals from industry and research and representatives from relevant Government 
agencies. BIOCOG's role is to provide advice to BA and the Ministerial Council. The Ministerial 
Council is consisted by ministers of relevant government sectors of Industry, Science and 
Resources, Environment and Heritage, Health and Aged Care, and Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs (ABA 2000). 
 
Recommended institutional measures to be taken by China 
In order to regulate biosafety and transboundary movement of GMOs, it is necessary for China to 
establish a cross-departmental biosafety coordinating commission at the national level headed by 
a competent national authority involved in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, because many 
sectors are involved in the issue. The commission should be responsible for policy-making and 
inter-departmental coordination on biosafety issues in the whole country. SEPA would head the 
commission as the national authority. The related departments would share out the work and 
cooperate with one another. For example, the Ministry of Science and Technology would be in 
charge of biotechnology research and development policy; MOFTEC in charge of international 
trade in GMOs; MOA, MOH and SMMA in charge of production of GMOs within their own 
fields; and SEPA in charge of GMO environmental administration in all stages of environmental 
release, commercial production, handling, transportation, use and marketing. 
                                                          
6 Australian Biotechnology: progress and achievements, Commonwealth of Australia 2000. P.6 
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 Under the national authority, it is necessary to establish a series of operational institutions, such 
as the national focal point for the Protocol, technical units of risk assessment and monitoring, and 
an information clearing-house.  
       
In addition, enhancing capacity-building of scientific research for biosafety is also very 
important. Due to lack of scientific certainty regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects 
of GMOs on the biodiversity and human health, there are many uncertainties involved in 
decision-making to introduce GMOs and GMO-based products. Therefore, it is essential to 
establish some national biosafety research institutes or laboratories and invest sufficient research 
funds to deal with these matters. (Liu and Xue 2000). 
 
5.2 Legislation construction 
 
Current legislation  
The following ministerial regulations concerning biosafety have been promulgated in China: 
(1) Safety Administration Regulation on Genetic Engineering 
The Regulation was issued by the former State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) on 
24 December 1993. It refers to recombinant DNA technology using the vector system and the 
direct introduction of heterogenic DNA into organisms by physical or chemical means. The 
regulation focuses on safety of biotechnology research and laboratory work, including 
stipulations on safety classification, safety assessment, application and approval, administrative 
measures, etc. 
 
(2) The Safety Administration Implementation Regulation on Agricultural Genetic Engineering" 
The Regulation is also a ministerial regulation based on the SSTC Regulation described above, 
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture on 10 July 1996. It provides detailed stipulations of the 
articles in SSTC Regulation concerning agricultural genetic engineering, and prescribes safety 
classes and corresponding management, especially the procedures for GMO registration and 
safety assessment.  
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(3) The Provisional Administration Regulation on Genetic Resources of Human Beings 
The regulation was issued by Ministry of Science and Technology (former SSTC) together with 
Ministry of Public Health on 10 June 1998. It provides the rules for collection, research, 
development, merchandising and export of human genes and human organs, cells, blood, genetic 
materials of recombinant DNA and related materials, etc.   
 
(4) Other regulations 
In April 1999, the State Medicine Monitoring Administration (SMMA) issued "Examining and 
Approving Rules for New Biological Medicines", meanwhile SMMA issued the revised 
"Regulation for Imported Medicines". Besides, Ministry of Public Health issued " Regulation of 
New Resource Food " in 1990. 
 
The practices in Western countries 
The philosophy underlying the US biosafety regulatory structures was set out by the US Office of 
Science and Technology Policy in 1986 in the "Co-ordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology".  To this end, biotechnology is regulated on a product basis rather than on a 
process basis, i.e. a product from biotechnology is regulated according to its intended use, not 
because it is produced by recombinant DNA-technology. Therefore, the regulation of GMOs is 
divided between three agencies of USDA, EPA and FDA. To accomplish their regulatory tasks, 
each agency was directed to examine its existing statutes for appropriateness to the products of 
biotechnology, and to expand their applicability, if necessary.  Consequently in the US, 
biotechnology is regulated by several pre-existing laws, instead of by one special biotechnology 
law. For example, EPA applies "Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act" and "Toxic 
Substances Control Act"; USDA applies "Federal Plant Pest Act" and "Federal Plant Quarantine 
Act"; and FDA applies "Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act" (Virgin 1999). So biotechnology 
in US is regulated by existing legislation, rather than new regulations specifically relating to 
biotechnology or GMOs. 
 
In contrast to the situation in the United States, the European legislation is process-based, and all 
organisms that originate from genetic modification are subject to specific GMO regulations. All 
regulations in Europe are more or less based on the two EC directives regulating the contained 
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use of GMOs (EC Directive 90/219) and the indeliberate release into the environment (EC 
Directive 90/220).  Furthermore, EU issued Directive 258/97 in 1997, specifically aimed at the 
commercialization of new GMO foods and new food components (Virgin 1999). All EC member 
countries must comply with EC statutes when they draft their national regulations. 
       
Australian governments are moving to introduce more relevant standards to cover genetically 
modified foods. A new Australian food standard legislation, the Standard A18 for Food Produced 
Using Gene Technology, came into effect on 13 May 1999, issued by Australian New Zealand 
Food Authority (ANZFA). The standard requires safety assessment of all GMO foods entering 
the market and need to be labeled. Some other guidelines and standards on GMO risk assessment 
and gene manipulation were issued by GMAC during the past 10 years. Furthermore, some 
regulations at provincial level are under debate, for example, a Draft Government Code of Ethical 
Practice for Biotechnology in Queensland (State) was released on 20 March 2000 for public 
comment. The draft code contains 26 basic commitments applicable to biotechnology 
organizations in Queensland, which are divided into three broad categories including general 
principles, agriculture food and environment, and health (DPI 2000). 
 
A new legislation, Gene Technology Bill 2000, is just issued by Commonwealth of Australia. It 
aims to protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by identifying 
risks posed by or as a result of gene technology. The regulatory framework established by the 
Gene Technology Bill 2000 is to operate concurrently with other Commonwealth and State 
regulatory schemes relevant to GMOs and GM products, including ANZFA, TGA, NRA, AQIS, 
Environment Australia, etc.7
 
Recommended legislative measures to be taken by China 
China has not set up a legislative system for biotechnology development and safety 
administration, though several regulations have been issued at the ministerial level. In particular, 
it is short of regulations relating to international trade in GMOs and their domestic marketing. So, 
now legislation in China to cover the following would be advantageous: 
 
                                                          
7 Australian Biotechnology: progress and achievement, Commonwealth of Australia 2000, p.7 
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(1) Establishing biosafety legislation  
The framework of this system should include law, regulations and rules at different levels of 
government. It would include: 1)a comprehensive law or regulation on biotechnology and safety 
at the national level promulgated by the People's Congress or the State Council; 2)a series of 
professional biosafety regulations or rules issued at ministerial level in the fields of agriculture, 
forestry, food, medicine, etc; and 3)a set of concrete rules, standards, guidelines and methods to 
be published by ministries or local governments. 
 
(2) Systemic legislation for trade in GMOs and their commercial use 
This legislation should cover export and import of GMOs including: approval, customs 
management, transboundary transportation, quality inspection and quarantine; GMO marketing 
covering commercial production, merchandising and use; and guidelines for foreign investment 
on GMO research and development. 
 
(3) GMO risk assessment mechanisms and administration  
It is essential to set up a suite of technical standards, including procedures and methods for GMO 
risk assessment, procedures for GMO introduction, application and approval, a license system for 
GMO commercial production, and labeling and purchasing requirements.  
 
5.3 Policy formulation 
 
Current principles 
China does not yet have a systematic policy for biotechnology safety, but some principles have 
already been proposed. 
 
(1) Supporting biotechnology research and development 
Since the 1980s, the Chinese government has been paying great attention to domestic 
biotechnology research and development. Hundreds of biotechnology research institutions have 
been established in China since the early 1980s, especially in agricultural sector. The Chinese 
government is convinced that biotechnology will play a key role in the 21st century in enabling 
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Chine to feed its large population. So biotechnology is taken as a priority for China’s 
development of science and technology in the 21 century. 
 
(2) Putting safety first 
China has displayed caution in introducing foreign GMO crops. Though local officials in the 
agricultural sector and farmers are keen on the possibility of planting foreign GMOs in order to 
raise production and increase their benefits, the Ministry of Agriculture of the central government 
has officially expressed some reservations about the introduction of GMOs and their use in 
commercial production, and have only cautiously approved a very limited number of foreign 
GMOs for pilot experiments and for commercial production. Nevertheless, the area planted with 
foreign GMOs is significant in some provinces. 
 
(3) Participating actively in the Biosafety Protocol negotiations  
China has shown its great concern in intergovernmental negotiations for the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety and attended all international negotiating activities during the past five years. 
Considerable coordinating work has been done by the ministries concerned. On Aug. 8, 2000, 
Chinese Government signed the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol in New York, the Headquarters of 
the United Nations, to be the 70th signatory country to the Protocol.8
 
(4) Studying and learning from experience in Western countries about regulation of GMOs 
China is short of national capacity for biosafety administration (it has limited experience) and 
expertise, while Western countries have a relatively long history of biotechnology safety 
management, especially in regulation, administration, labeling, etc. China may hope to learn 
more from the experience of the Western countries. In particular, it may prefer the strict 
administrative model of most European countries.  
 
The policies of the Western countries 
Generally speaking, the United States and some other countries execute a relatively loose 
administrative model to cope with GMOs. They only regulate the safety of products in the final 
stage rather than products during the process of GMO research and development. In the United 
                                                          
8 http://www.sina.com.cn 2000/08/08, news from People's Daily (China). 
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States, no specific GMO labeling is required. Labeling is required only if the quality of the 
product has changed, but the label is only required to describe the change in quality of the 
product, not to specify that a GMO as such is present (Virgin 1999). 
       
However, EU countries apply a relatively strict administrative model to GMOs. In EU and some 
other European countries, the whole process of GMO research, development, release and 
commercial production is strictly regulated, step by step and case by case. Furthermore, in 
Europe, the use of genetic engineering in food and agriculture is a highly debated issue. The 
European Union Novel Food Regulation approved in 1997(EC 258/97), states that "novel foods 
and their ingredients produced by means of genetic engineering" must be GMO labeled when: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
                                                          
there is no substantial equivalence between a novel food and its original counterpart; 
when materials present in the novel food are not present in an equivalent non-modified 
product and may have consequences for the health of certain groups of people;  
when the novel food contains biotechnologically derived material that may present ethical 
problems; and  
when living GMOs are present in the food.  
 
EU also takes a united stand on GMOs in member countries. A biotechnology guiding 
commission was founded in 1984, it is responsible to coordinate the national biotechnology 
polices of member countries. With respect of commercialization of GMOs and novel food, it is 
necessarily to gain approval by all 15 member-countries, otherwise they will be prohibited within 
EU countries.  
       
Generally, GMO policy in Australia is close to that of European countries, and there exists a 
major debate about GMO food safety. So far Australian commercial production of GM crops is 
limited to GM cotton, and the public is greatly concerned by GM food. This concern will affect 
the government's GMO policy. 
 
Especially, Australia has developed a national strategy on biotechnology at Commonwealth 
level.9 It put forward a series of objectives, strategies and policies on biotechnology management. 
9 Australian Biotechnology: a national strategy, Commonwealth of Australia 2000. 
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The strategy was drafted by BA, consulted with BIOCOG, and coordinated by the Ministerial 
Council. 
 
Recommended policy measures to be taken by China in relation to GMOs  
(1) Marketing development policies for GMOs and products 
Based on the safety classes of GMOs, different policies should be pursued. They are:  
To encourage and support riskless GMOs and products by the detailed policies 
establishing risk-investment foundation and credit loans, reducing taxes and promoting 
preferential development; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
To cautiously develop lower-risk GMOs and products with the policies of executing 
environment impacts assessment, licensing for commercial production and marketing, and 
risk management; 
To limit development of medium-risk GMOs and products by strictly controlling the 
commercial production and labeling the marketed products; and 
To prohibit development for high-risk GMOs and products by banning this commercial 
production. 
  
(2) Policies for importing foreign GMOs and products 
According to the stipulations of Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the policies should  focus on: 
Executing AIA procedure and decision procedure for any exporter's notifications for 
GMOs transboundary movement; 
Establishing licensing regimes for allowed import of GMOs and products; 
Conducting risk assessment for any foreign GMOs before they are approved for 
introduction; 
Requiring identification for handling, package, transportation and storage of foreign 
GMOs and products, and market labeling; 
Identifying exporter's liability and redress when environmental damage occurs as result of 
happened by imported GMOs or GMO-based products. 
 
(3) Polices for foreign investment in projects for development of GMOs 
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Besides the existing polices in foreign sole investment and joint ventures, some special attention 
should be paid to: 
Guiding foreign investment projects in biotechnological development by classifying 
investment projects as categories of encouragement, permission, limitation and prohibition.    
• 
• Managing foreign investment projects properly through information requirements, risk 
assessment and approval procedures.   
 
5.4 Technical measures to control import of MGOs 
 
The legal measures mandated by Cartagena Protocol and WTO agreements. 
The Biosafety Protocol requires exporters to apply the AIA procedure to obtain the consent of 
importing countries before delivering shipment of GMOs. The concern of exporters is that the 
AIA procedure could be used simply as a non-tariff barrier to trade and result in some trade 
disputes. Exporters want the relationship between the Protocol and WTO agreements clarified 
properly. 
 
The Protocol, in its preamble, recognizes that trade and environments should be mutually 
supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development and emphasizes that the Protocol 
shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any 
existing international agreements. But the next paragraph in the preamble adds that the Parties to 
the Protocol understand that the above provision is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to 
other international agreements. Article 2(4) requires that the actions taken by Parties should be 
consistent with the objective and the provisions of this Protocol and are in accordance with its 
other obligations under international law. It clearly intends that the Protocol's obligations are 
parallel to countries' duties and obligations under WTO agreements and other international 
agreements.  
        
However, WTO obligations are not inconsistent with GMO safety regulation. There are already 
provisions for the protection of the environment and human health under the WTO. It is the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). SPS was 
completed during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which also culminated in 
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the establishment of the WTO. SPS is an explicitly science-based agreement. It mandates that 
countries base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures (relating to human, animal, and plant 
health and safety) upon sound science and allows for precautionary decision-making only on a 
provisional basis, until further scientific evidence of harm or lack thereof has been obtained 
(Wirth 1994, Gupta 2000). So, the AIA procedure, as a green barrier for health protection, does 
not conflict with SPS under WTO. The Protocol also does not prevent the GMO-exporting 
countries from using the WTO dispute settlement procedure to clarify existing obligations under 
the trade regime (Falkner 2000). 
 
Green barriers to importing GMOs 
Green barriers can be one kind of technical barrier to trade. They involve countermeasures taken 
by importing countries to limit the import of some foreign goods in order to protect environment 
and human health in the importing country. Green barriers are preventive measures mainly based 
on the existing international conventions, protocols, agreements and standards on environmental 
protection and quarantine. Green barriers are, more or less, legitimate, but often involve much 
politicalisation. As more and more non-tariff barriers to trade are demolished in the process of 
trade globalization, green barriers have gradually increased. They have become important 
technical barriers to current international trade.  
       
US, EU countries and Japan already have statutes, directives and standards which limit the import 
of some commodities to their countries on the basis of technical measures, such as chemical 
residues, quarantine of animals and plants, quality inspection, limiting packing materials, etc. For 
example, US Department of Agriculture (USDA) presented a proposal in March 2000 for 
nationwide standards defining organic foods. The proposal specifically prohibits the use of 
genetic engineering from agricultural products bearing the organic label. A few weeks before the 
USDA's proposal, US Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) introduced legislation, the "Genetically 
Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act" (S.2080), which would mandate labels specifying whether 
a product contains or was produced with GM materials (Fox 2000).  
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On 12 January 2000, the Commission of the European Communities issued its "Food Safety 
White Paper", which sets out over 80 separate actions that are envisaged over the next few years 
in order to improve food safety standards10.  
       
Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare has announced that all foods containing GM ingredients 
will undergo mandatory tests for potential health risks and should be labeled accordingly, 
beginning from April 200111. Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also decided 
in last August to introduce mandatory labeling of 30 food products containing more than 5% 
GMOs ingredients, including soybeans, potatoes, and corn, beginning from April 2001(Saegusa 
1999). Also South Korea will execute a GMO food labeling system.  
       
China is short of experience in relation to green trade barriers and has often suffered foreign 
discrimination for its exports, involving high economic losses. As a large importer of GMO food, 
China should learn from foreign experience about the use of green barriers. There is an 
opportunity for China to impose green barriers on GMO food imports, based on the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, GMO properties and domestic legislation, in order to protect the country's 
economic benefits, environmental safety and the people's health. 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
 
Attitudes towards negotiations for the Cartagena Protocol were shown in this paper to differ 
between countries depending on whether the countries involved were likely to be major net 
importers of GMOs or major exporters. It is mainly developing countries that are likely to be net 
importers of GMOs in the foreseeable future. Less developed countries (with some support from 
the EU) were especially concerned that there be adequate provision to ensure that a country 
importing LMOs, or products based on these, be able to prevent their import, where there is the 
possibility of considerable risk to its conservation and use of biodiversity, or to human health. 
Furthermore, developing countries wanted to make sure that there was adequate provision in the 
Protocol for liability and redress should they suffer damage as the result of their import of LMOs 
                                                          
10 White Paper on Food Safety, Commission of the European Communities, SANCO/3578/99, Brussels, 12 Jan. 
2000. 
11 Japan steps up GMO tests, Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 18(2): 131, 2000 
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or products based on these. While agreement was reached on the first issue that was not possible 
on the second matter, and its resolution has been left to the first meeting of the Conference of 
Parties to the Protocol. 
 
Globally the cropped area planted to GM crops is expanding rapidly with the USA and Canada 
being the main producers. China, in recent times, has increased its food and agricultural imports 
substantially and the USA and Canada are the principle sources of such imports. Consequently, 
China is already importing large quantities of GM products. 
 
The Chinese Government is also of the view that GM crops will make a large contribution to 
agricultural productivity in the 21st century. It is expanding its capabilities in genetic engineering 
and accelerating the introduction of biotechnology to farms. Nevertheless, China appears to have 
little scope to export GMOs and GM products. 
 
China needs to adopt a range of administrative measures to implement the Cartagena Protocol 
and to regulate its import of GMOs and GM agricultural products. These were outlined taking 
into account policies adopted in Western countries. The possibility of China using green barriers 
to limit the import of GMOs is discussed. Green barriers have become increasingly important 
barriers to international trade as other technical barriers to international trade have been reduced 
by the WTO. However, once the Cartagena Protocol is in effect, GMO exporting countries are 
likely to increasingly use WTO dispute settlement procedures to reduce such barriers. So this 
could limit China’ s scope to use such barriers effectively; as would bilateral negotiations outside 
the WTO framework. In such negotiations, wealthy countries, such as the USA, may have an 
advantage in terms of their ability to provide economic incentives e.g. aid, or mount threats e.g. 
withdrawal of aid. 
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